Ambassador Baiba Braže, the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO
Mathieu Boulègue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Anton Herashchenko, Deputy Minister of Interior, Ukraine
Jukka Savolainen, Director, Community of Interests on Vulnerabilities and Resilience, The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
Moderator: Orysia Lutsevych, Head, Ukraine Forum; Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Andriy Yermak, Head of Office of the President of Ukraine
Chair: Orysia Lutsevych, Head of Ukraine Forum, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
The election of Volodymyr Zelensky as president of Ukraine created very high expectations in the society.
Leonid LITRA, Alyona GETMANCHUK
Moscow has maneuvered Ukraine’s Presidential Office into quasi-recognizing Russia’s military proxies in “certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Russian and Ukrainian acronym: ORDLO) for the first time. The vehicle for this breakthrough is the agreement on “Measures to Strengthen the Ceasefire Regime,” negotiated in the Minsk Contact Group, released on July 22, and effective from July 27 for an unlimited duration (President.gov.ua, July 22, 28).
The coronavirus has hit Ukraine hard, but the IMF has promised the country less funding than seemed likely only months ago. Self-interested oligarchs are delaying necessary new reforms and pushing back against those Ukraine has already made.
The COVID-19 pandemic is stress testing all political systems for their ability to ensure the survival of their populations. It is not just the public health systems of different countries that are being tested but the very ability of governments to fight the pandemic. Ukraine, like other of its post-Soviet neighbors, has undergone this scrutiny with mixed results. With an optional quarantine in place, it has experienced a low confirmed mortality, an even lower level of testing, and significant damage to the economy.